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INTRODUCTION
Articles on this subject often begin by citing the National Safety Council
statistics that over two million workers are injured each year, 14,000 are killed,
and 190,000 are permanently disabled by industrial accidents.' The passage
of the Williams-Steiger Bill in 19702 which established the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) clearly reflects our legislators' beliefs
that this accident toll is intolerably high. Further, one can infer from the Re-
port of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws
(NCSWCL)3 that the current compensation to victims of industrial accidents
is grossly inadequate. Legislative actions at both federal and state levels have
mainly been intended to achieve two objectives: (1) to reduce the frequency
and severity of work-related injuries and diseases, and (2) to provide more
equitable compensation to victims of these mishaps. The former has significance
for economic efficiency, indicating that the present industrial accident toll
exceeds some socially optimal accident toll. The latter is concerned with what
constitutes "just and fair" compensation. 4 An economist has something to
say about the former issue, and I shall try to do so in this paper even though
I agree with Professor Stigler who wrote, "[1]acking real expertise and lacking
also evangelical ardor, the economist has had little influence upon the evolu-
tion of economic policy."5
*Professor, Graduate School of Management, University of Rochester; Visiting Senior Re-
search Economist, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University (1973-74).
' NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 18 (1972). These data were based on the old
Z16.1 standard-the BLS, pre-OSHA, injury data compilation technique-wherein a work injury
was counted only if the injured worker was unable to report for work on the day following
the accident. The reporting requirements under OSHA, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1904.1-.22 (1973),
have expanded the scope to include more minor injuries as well as diseases which, in the last
half of 1971, accounted for 5 per cent of all cases under the new standard. This shift in the
definition of work injuries has roughly trebled the number of injuries. In the future, we should
expect to read that over 6 or 7 million workers are injured each year. For further details on the
comparability of the old and new data series, see Schauer & Ryder, New Approach to Occupational
Safety and Health Statistics, 95 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 14 (1972).
2 Pub. L. No. 91-596, §§ 2-34, 84 Stat. 1590 (Dec. 29, 1970) (codified in scattered sections of
5, 15, 18, 29, 42, 49 U.S.C.).
3 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws, THE REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws (1972).
4 Some policies that are addressed to the equity objective may also have an impact on efficiency.
Thus, according to the NCSWCL Report, the workmen's compensation program may encourage
safety by giving employers a monetary incentive to invest in safety-and thereby improve their
safety records-in order to reduce premium costs. Id. at 87. No empirical evidence was offered
to support this conjecture.
'Stigler, The Economist and the State, 55 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 12 (1965). This is not to say that
economists have had no influence. In the same article Stigler writes, "even when economists
took an active and a direct interest in a policy issue, they did not make systematic empirical studies
to establish the extent and nature of the problem or the probable efficiency of alternative methods
of solving the problem." Id. at 11. It is a serious indictment of the profession, but the same absence
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Calabresi has convincingly argued that the goal of public policy should
be the minimization of the sum of accident costs and accident prevention costs.0
A legal limit on the heights of skyscrapers would surely reduce fatalities in
the construction trades, but would it be consistent with the maximum welfare
of society? Policies that reduce the frequency and severity of industrial acci-
dents are desirable only if it can be demonstrated that industrial safety is
presently below that socially optimal level which minimizes the sum of accident
and accident prevention costs. In measuring accident costs, it is important
to distinguish between risks and outcomes. How much additional compensation
would be demanded by Jones to accept a job on which he knew he would lose
a leg? Alternatively, how much additional compensation would be demanded
by 100 Joneses if they knew that one of them was virtually certain to lose a
leg? The latter is the pertinent question for workers who offer their labor
services in hazardous employments. The value of a leg is not invariant to the
probability of losing a leg. In evaluating accident cost savings, the relevant
measure is thus the value to groups of workers of lower injury risks, not the
value of fewer unfortunate outcomes to particular named individuals. 7 The
case histories which have been advanced in favor of more industrial safety
have largely neglected the difficult problem of identifying and measuring
accident prevention costs. And safety literature appears not to question the
belief that whatever the prevention costs, they must be less than the benefits
of lower accident costs.
Part I of the paper develops the concept of an optimum level of safety in
a world of inherent injury risks. The model is relaxed in Part II where work
injury risks can be influenced by accident avoiding actions by employers and
workers. Since no one intentionally injures another, the observed work injury
rates can be viewed as equilibrium rates that may differ from socially optimal
rates. Part III then presents some empirical evidence on injury rate differentials
over time and across industries, occupations, establishment sizes, and char-
acteristics of workers. These empirical regularities are suggestive of some of the
properties of the technological trade-offs between injuries and goods. In the
light of the analytic framework of Part II and the empirical results of Part
III, a final section evaluates the policies initiated by OSHA and the recom-
mendations set forth by the NCSWCL.
of systematic empirical studies also characterizes other designers of public policy. Finally, "the
extent to which safety in production processes and purity in products are achieved by a competitive
market and by a regulatory body" is listed by Stigler as one of five subjects that has not been
"investigated with even modest thoroughness." Id.
6 G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
7 This distinction is put nicely by Thaler and Rosen who develop empirical estimates of the
value of saving a life as opposed to the value of a life. R. Thaler & S. Rosen, The Value of Saving
a Life: Evidence From the Labor Market (paper presented at the National Bureau of Economic
Research Conference, Washington, D.C., Nov. 30, 1973). The problem only arises for injuries
that involve death or permanent disability. I have argued that the accident costs of temporary
disabilities that do not change the injured worker's post-recovery productivity can be valued
like objects with market values. With perfect insurance markets, a certain loss of $500 is the same
as the uncertain prospect of losing $1,000 with a probability of 0.5. Oi, An Essay on Workmen's
Compensation and Industrial Safety, in 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAws, SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS 41, 59 (1973).
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I
OPTIMAL SAFETY IN A WORLD OF INHERENT INJURY RISKS
At the outset, attention is directed to a simple model in which work injury
risks are inherent; that is, risks in each industry cannot be affected by actions
of either employers or workers. Although the model can be generalized to
many industries, the essential principles can be derived by invoking the fol-
lowing assumptions: (1) all work injuries are alike and result in temporary total
disability of H working days; (2) there are only two industries with injury
risks of 7r in industry 1 which produces good X and zero in industry 2 which
produces good Y; and (3) the welfare of consumers depends on outputs of
the two goods (X,Y) where the relative demands (X/Y) are inversely related
to relative product prices (P/P,,).
The accident costs for the economy as a whole can be expressed as the
cost per disabling injury -/ times the number of injuries A: Ca = -A. By assump-
tion injury risks are inherent (7r in industry 1 and 0 in industry 2), so that the
number of injuries A is determined by employment in the risky industry
L,: A = 1rL1. A worker who offers his labor to the risky industry is exposed
to an uncertain income stream. In the event that he is injured, he incurs
medical bills and loses wage income during the period of H days of temporary
disability. If W, is the annual wage rate in the risky industry, the worker gets
either W, if uninjured or (1-h)WI if injured.8 The injury cost -y for a risk
neutral worker is simply hW1 and something greater than hW1 for a risk averse
worker who incurs a utilitarian cost of risk-bearing. 9 A lower bound to the
accident costs is thus given by Ca = yA = hW1 7rL,.
In a world of inherent risks, accident prevention might appear to be in-
feasible. The economy can, however, reduce the aggregate injury risk (and
hence accident costs) by shifting workers from the risky to the riskless industry.'0
The impact of such a shift on the sum of accident and accident prevention costs
depends on the initial allocation of labor and on consumer preferences for
the products of the two industries. The maximum outputs of X and Y that can
be produced with fixed supplies of labor and other resources can be de-
l If there are T working days per year, then h = H/T is the fraction of a year that is lost due
to an injury. The cost of medical care can be incorporated into H. Thus, if the injury entails
medical bills of S100 and the daily wage is $20, then we need only add 5 days to the duration of
the temporary disability to incorporate this component of the accident cost.
The expected or average annual income W, earned by workers in the risky industry is given by,
W1 = (1 - 7r)W + 7r(1 - h)Wl= (1 - irh)Wl.
Let U = U(W) denote the worker's utility function. The expected utility 0 from the uncertain
income prospect of either W1 if uninjured or (1 - h)W1 if injured is simply,
0 = (1 - ir)U(W1) + rU [(1 - h)Wl ].
For a risk averse individual, the marginal utility of income is diminishing, U" < 0. There is some
certain income stream, W1, such that U(W1 ) = U. It can be shown that when U" < 0, Wi is less
than ,VI, and the difference, (W1I - W) can be interpreted as the utilitarian cost of risk-bearing.
This point is amplified in Oi, supra note 7, at 51. Put in another way, if a risk averse individual
had an uncertain income prospect, [W,, (1 - h)W1 ] with an expected income of say V1 = $9,000,
he would be prepared to give up some of that expected income if he could be assured of a certain
income of say W, = $8,900. In this example, the utilitarian cost of risk-bearing would be $100.
10 Let k, = L,/(L, + L,) denote the proportion of the labor force employed in the risky in-
dustry. The aggregate injury risks for all workers is then simply A/(L 1 + L2) = K,r.
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scribed by a product transformation curve like AB in Figure 1. At point
A, X = 0 implying that L, = 0, and hence accident costs will also be zero. By
moving to the right along AB, the economy can get more output X from the
risky industry but at a cost of less output of Y and more work injuries. Consumer
preferences for the two goods can be described by a family of indifference
curves like I, and 12 where 12 represents consumption bundles that yield a
higher utility than bundles along I,. The maximum of consumer preferences
(utility) that can be attained with fixed resources is achieved at the bliss point
E where the highest indifference curve is just tangent to the product transfor-
mation curve. Since the loss of productive labor time due to injuries is already
incorporated in the AB curve, the bliss point E corresponds to an optimum
bundle of goods (X,Y) which, in turn implies the allocation of labor to the two
industries. The aggregate injury rate, k1ir that corresponds to point E, is thus
an optimum level of industrial safety which maximizes consumer welfare."
y
A
E 21
G
B
X
FIGURE 1
Various policies such as the imposition of an excise tax on good X could
reduce output and employment L, in the risky industry thereby lowering
accident costs. If we were initially at the bliss point E, an excise tax on X could
induce a movement from E to F. However, at point F, consumers (who are
also workers) are forced to a lower level of utility. Although accident costs
are lower at F, the marginal value that consumers attach to the output X of
the risky industry exceeds the opportunity cost (including the cost of more
injuries) of producing more of X. The accident prevention cost in this model
is thus seen to be derived from consumer preferences for the outputs (X,Y)
of risky and riskless industries.
Is there any reason to expect that competitive forces will lead to a market
equilibrium at the bliss point E? If workers are informed about the inherent
11 The problem of maximizing utility subject to a resource constraint is the dual to the problem
of minimizing resource inputs to attain a given level of utility described by a particular indifference
curve. When consumer utility (welfare) is maximized the economy is also minimizing the sum of
accident and accident prevention costs.
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injury risks, they realize that employment in the risky industry entails a po-
tential income loss of y = hW1 which will occur with probability 7r. Assume that
workers are liable for all accident costs. Under risk neutrality, a worker would
supply his labor to the risky industry only if the wage in that industry W, ex-
ceeded the certain riskless wage in the other industry, W2, by an amount equal
to the expected income loss due to injury. Hence, in equilibrium, (1-7rh)W,
= W2, and the risk premium (or equalizing wage differential) will be (W,-W 2)
= 7rhW, =- ry. The higher wage will increase the marginal cost and hence the
price of X, the product of the risky industry. Given competitive product and
labor markets, product prices will be equated to marginal costs, and since the
marginal cost of X (given W,-W 2 = 'ny) fully incorporates all of the accident
costs, the resulting market equilibrium will be at a bliss point E. The same
optimal safety level will also be attained in a world of risk averse workers if
insurance is fair.' 2 However, with risk averse workers and no insurance market,
the risk premium in the risky industry must exceed the expected injury cost
by an amount equal to the utilitarian cost of risk-bearing for the marginal
worker. In this event, the market equilibrium will be at a point to the left of E."3
Consider next a situation in which workers are initially ignorant and be-
lieve that the risks are the same in the two industries. Wage rates would then
be the same, W, = W2, and the equilibrium would be at a point like G in Fig-
ure 1. At G, the economy is allocating "too much" labor to the risky industry
and suffers a high aggregate injury toll. But is this a stable equilibrium? The
uninformed workers in the risky industry earn, on average, less than their peers
in the riskless industry Y because some fraction ir of them will be injured each
year and incur wage losses. Employers in the riskless industry Y clearly have
an incentive to point out this fact to workers in industry X. If W, = W2,
employers who inform workers about the injury risks in industry X, could
attract those workers at any wage exceeding (1-irh)WI. As more workers are
attracted to the riskless industry Y, wage rates there, W2, will fall until even-
tually the equalizing wage differential, (W1 - W2) = iry, that prevailed
with fully informed workers is reestablished. Full information by all partic-
ipants is not essential to establish an optimum competitive market equilib-
rium.
Finally, it should be noted that the assignment of liability for accident
costs has no effect on the allocation of labor and hence on the equilibrium
number of disabling injuries. If employers were liable, there would be a dis-
12 By fair insurance, I mean that the premium rate p per dollar of coverage is just equal to the
injury risk ,r. Eisner and Strotz, Smith, and others have proven that with actuarially fair insurance
rates, risk averse individuals will always demand full coverage against all potential losses. See,
e.g., Eisner & Strotz, Flight Insurance and the Theory of Choice, 69 J. POL. ECON. 355 (1961); Smith,
Optimal Insurance Coverage, 76 J. POL. ECON. 68 (1968). Hence, with fair insurance, fully insured,
risk averse workers behave just like neutral workers who maximize expected income irrespective
of the variance of income. A fuller discussion of this point can be found in Oi, supra note 7, at 52.
13 It will still be the case that the least risk averse workers, who incur the lowest utilitarian
cost of risk-bearing, will end up in the risky industry. The equilibrium with no insurance mar-
ket is not a socially optimal one because risk averse workers are unable to spread the accident
costs. Since the added cost of risk-bearing, (WI - W2) > 'ry, must be incorporated into the mar-
ginal cost of producing X, this non-optimal equilibrium results in a contraction in the output
of X and fewer injuries.
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crepancy between the wages paid to workers (I shall refer to these as
earnings) and the wage costs to employers in the risky industry. The earnings
of workers in the risky industry will be equal to the wages in the riskless in-
dustry, but wage costs in the risky industry will be higher by the amount of
the expected injury cost. Moreover, the presence of workmen's compensation
in this world of inherent risks also has no effect. If workers receive benefits
from workmen's compensation in the event of an injury, the expected value of
these benefits will simply reduce the size of the equalizing risk premium
needed to attract workers to the risky industry.
II
EQUILIBRIUM INJURY RATES UNDER ENDOGENOUS RISKS
While industrial accidents are random events, the probabilities (injury
risks) of these regrettable events can be influenced by employers and work-
ers. Technology, however, constrains the extent to which injury risks can be
controlled. Some jobs, such as drilling and tunneling or refuse collection, are
inherently more dangerous than others. The incentives and information avail-
able to the involved parties will affect injury risks (and hence injury rates)
within these technological constraints. The observed injury rate differentials
over time and across industries, occupations, and types of workers can thus
be viewed as equilibrium injury rates that were simultaneously determined
by the interaction of the demand for, and supply of, industrial safety by em-
ployers and workers. The equilibrium will obviously be affected by compul-
sory insurance schemes and mandatory safety standards.
Industrial accidents and the injuries that they inflict can properly be
viewed as undesirable by-products. 4 Textbook production functions de-
scribe how inputs of labor and capital can be transformed into outputs of
economic goods. A more accurate picture is one in which firms face joint
production functions wherein inputs generate two joint products, economic
goods X and work injuries or accidents A. If instead of injuries A, we mea-
sure their complement, uninjured workers B, then for a given outlay for in-
puts, there is a negative technical trade-off between goods X and uninjured
workers B. Given its outlays for labor, capital, and other inputs (including
safety), a firm can expand its "output" of uninjured workers B (achieving a
lower injury rate) only by reducing output of its principal product X. These
technical trade-offs can be achieved in a variety of ways. A firm could pur-
chase safety inputs such as installing guards, hiring safety engineers, or
paying new employees to attend orientation lectures on safe work practices.
Alternatively, it could initiate safety practices such as slowing down the speed
of its assembly lines or giving liberal sick leave privileges to guard against the
possibilities of accidents caused by workers who return to work before they have
fully recovered from an illness. The firm's safety expenditures S must include
not only the identifiable costs of safety inputs but also the implicit opportu-
nity costs equal to the value of output X that could have been produced in the
11 See text at pp. 672-74 supra.
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absence of the safety practices. The rational firm will choose that combina-
tion of safety inputs and practices which minimize the total safety expenditures
S needed to achieve any given injury risk ir."
In this manner, the technical trade-offs between goods and injuries can
be incorporated into the firm's safety expenditures S which include both the
explicit costs (of inspectors, safety devices, and so on) and the implicit
costs (of slowing assembly lines, rest periods, and so on). We can thus specify
an injury risk function which describes the accident prevention cost function
for the firm:
(1) 7r=g(S,L) - g<0, -=gL>O.
dS gdL
S C
a
w1 7l"
FIGURE 2
Holding employment L constant, an increase in safety expenditures will re-
duce the injury risk -r . Conversely, when safety outlays S are held constant,
an increase in employment L can be expected to increase the injury risk
ir because the firm now spends less on industrial safety for each worker.' 6
Within certain technological limits, the firm can, in principle, alter its injury
risks by allocating more or less resources to safety. For a given size of the
15 For analytic simplicity, I have assumed that the injury risk can be described by a single
parameter ir, the -probability of being injured. The wide diversity of work-related injuries could
have been described by a vector of probabilities for each type of injury ranging from cuts and
bruises through loss of limb to deaths. I felt that the simplifying assumption was warranted in
the light of the modest objectives of the analysis set forth here.
10 Equation (1) can be derived in another way. Let A = injured workers, while B = L - A =
uninjured workers that are "produced" by combining safety S and labor L via the production
function,
d!B dB>.B=f(S,L) -> 0, ->0.dS dL
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labor force L, the inverse of equation (1) is depicted by the S curve in Figure
2 above. The position and shape of the S curve will obviously vary across firms
and industries being higher for the innately more hazardous industries. 17 The
S curve thus describes the firm's accident prevention costs; the firm must
allocate more to safety expenditures S in order to achieve a lower injury
risk ir.
A higher work injury risk ir can lead to larger accident costs to the firm
in terms of both labor and material costs. Industrial accidents are often ac-
companied by destruction of machinery and materials, disruptions in pro-
duction schedules, and so on. In terms of labor costs, the replacement of
injured workers unavoidably raises the firm's labor turnover with an accom-
panying increase in the fixed employment cost of recruiting and training new
employees. Furthermore, a firm that can offer safer working conditions can
attract workers at lower wage rates that contain smaller risk premium com-
ponents. If the wage rate is related to the injury risk via the relationship,
W = W(ir) with W' (ir) > 0, the accident costs to the firm Ca, can be
written:' 8
dCa
(2) Ca = [Fir + W(r) ]L, C'a =-r [F + W'(r) IL > 0,
where F is the sum of the material costs and the fixed employment cost per
accident. If equation (1) is inverted to yield, S = G(7r,L), where (dS/dir) =
Gir < 0, we write the sum of accident and accident prevention costs for the firm
as follows:
(3) Ca + S = [Fir + W(r) ]L + G('r,L).
An increase in safety expenditures S which lowers the injury risk 7r will
reduce the sum of accident and accident prevention costs if (C'a + S') > 0,
that is,
(4) - S' < C'a, -G.(ir,L) < [F + W'(w)]L.
If this function is homogeneous of the first degree, it can be rewritten as,
A= h(0).
L L
An increase in safety per worker, (S/L) should lead to a larger fraction of uninjured workers
(B/L); that is, h' > 0. The injury risk is simply ir = A/L, but since B = L - A, we have,
ir= I - = I - h(0).
L L
It is apparent that this expression (given h' > 0) will yield the same derivatives as that attributed
to the g function of equation (1).
27 The S curve depicted in Figure 2 incorporates the plausible assumption of diminishing
returns to safety outlays. In terms of equation (1), diminishing returns means that (dir/dS) < 0,
and (d2 ir/dS 2) > 0. It also seems reasonable to suppose that even when the firm spends nothing on
safety, there is some upper limit to the injury risk ir,.
18 If the fixed employment cost is R, we can write,
total labor cost = RH + WL,
where H is the flow of new hires needed to sustain a labor force of L workers. We can relate H
to L via,
H = (q + lr)L,
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The marginal prevention cost curve, -S', and the marginal accident cost
curve, C'a, are shown in Figure 3. From the firm's viewpoint, an equilib-
rium injury rate if is attained when -S' = C'a.
-S t
C1
a
r 7"
FIGURE 3
If workers do not fully incorporate the costs to them of higher injury risks,
W'(r) will be close to zero implying a downward shift and a flattening
of the C'a curve. In this event, 4r will climb because employers have
less incentive to spend resources on safety. To the extent that the wage
structure, W = W(ir), does not fully incorporate the accident costs
to workers, the equilibrium injury rate ir exceeds a socially optimal injury
rate i*. It is believed that workmen's compensation brings us closer to
socially optimal injury risks because a firm's premium costs are linked to its
injury experience, at least for the largest firms.' 9 Two remarks are in order
where q is the quit rate and ir is the injury rate. Notice that the quit component of total labor costs,
RqL, has been omitted in equation (2). 1 have skimmed over some rough edges of this model
including (a) that the injury risk must be converted to annual losses of workers, and (b) that if
injuries only involve temporary disabilities, the fixed cost of replacing injured workers will be
below R. The importance of fixed employment costs is more fully discussed in Oi, Labor as a Quasi-
fixed Factor, 70 J. POL. EcoN. 538 (1962). The parameter F is the sum of R and the material
cost M. Finally, the relationship, W = W(ir), should strictly only pertain to that part of the wage
rate that consists of the risk premium. The convex shape of the Ca curve in Figure 2 incorporates
the assumptions that,
d._W -= W'(r) > 0, d2-W = W"(r) > O.
d~r dwr2
In terms of the discussion in Part I, if Wo is the wage in a riskless industry (with iro = 0), then we
have,
w( L) ) W0,
W(I)- 1-rh
which yields the desired convex shape for Ca.
19 This argument is more fully developed in Russell, Pricing Industrial Accidents, in 3 NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE
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here. First, if the premium costs-which are merely a portion of the accident
costs to injured workers-comprise only a small part of the marginal accident
costs, even a full assignment to firms of costs to victims will lead to only a
small shift in C'0 , meaning only a small change in equilibrium injury
rates r. 2 0 Second, if the compulsory partial insurance under workmen's
compensation is a close substitute for private insurance (purchased by
either the worker or employer), any change in benefit levels under workmen's
compensation will simply result in a substitution of public for private insur-
ance with very little change in the risk structure of wage costs, W = W(ir).
This model can also be used to analyze how a change in the size of a firm's
labor force L will affect 'ft. Equation (4) tells us that a rise in L will lead to
upward shifts in both the marginal accident cost C'a and accident preven-
tion cost -S' curves. The upward shift in C'a will be directly proportional
to the increase in L, but the magnitude of the shift in -S' depends on the prop-
erties of equation (1). If there are increasing returns to accident prevention as
many allege (meaning that if S and L were increased by the same proportion,
7r would fall), the -S' curve rises by less than the rise in L. In this event,
the equilibrium injury risk -fr will fall as the size of the labor force is in-
creased. To the extent that technical properties of joint production functions
for goods and injuries vary across industries and occupations (and possibly
even over time), we should expect to observe variations in equilibrium injury
rates. The important question is, however, under what conditions will these
equilibrium injury risks correspond to socially optimal work injury risks?
If, for the moment, we assume that the fraction of accidents due to con-
tributory negligence by workers is the same in all industries and is unaffected
by employer actions, I believe that two conditions must be met to realize the
equality between equilibrium and socially optimal injury risks. First,
the marginal accident cost curve, C'%, must represent the social costs of
additional increments to risk that are incurred by injured workers and by
injured employment sites. This condition will be met if the risk structure of
wage cost, W = W(ir) incorporates all accident costs to victims and if F is equal
to the social costs of replacing injured workers and repairing damaged em-
ployment sites. Second, firms must be efficient in the provision of accident
prevention; otherwise, the -S' curve will not represent the social costs of
accident prevention. It is sometimes argued that ill-informed employers are
unaware of the technology of accident prevention or its effectiveness. This
argument can be translated into the curves of Figure 3. The ill-informed firm
perceives a -S' curve that is to the right of the true marginal accident
prevention cost curve. Given this misperception, the firm spends too little
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws 27 (1973). The internalization
of the compensation costs offers a partial explanation for the variations in injury rates across
establishment size groups, but it cannot explain why the smallest establishments in many industries
have lower injury rates than middle-sized establishments.
20 Surry states that the indirect costs (of damaged machinery, lost labor time by supervisors
and fellow-workers, output losses, and so on) may be two to five times the workmen's compen-
sation costs for an accident. J. SURRY, INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT RESEARCH: A HUMAN ENGINEERING
APPRAISAL (1971). Her estimates are in line with those reported by Simonds and Grimaldi.
R. SIMONDS & J. GRIMALDI, SAFETY MANAGEMENT, ACCIDENT COST AND CONTROL (1963).
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on safety resulting in an equilibrium risk 7 that exceeds the optimal risk.
Such firms can either be induced to allocate more resources to safety (through
persuasion or public information programs) or be coerced to do so by the im-
position of mandatory safety standards backed by inspection enforcement.
But in discussing optimality, we cannot ignore my earlier assumption of
proportional contributory negligence.
The blame for the current industrial accident toll must be shared by em-
ployers and workers. Work injury risks surely depend on the safety char-
acteristics of both work environments and workers. The risks can be af-
fected by a worker's physical and mental health, his exercise of care on the
job, or the matching of job and personal attributes--all factors that can best
be controlled by the worker.21 It might well be the case that the work injury
toll could be even more sharply reduced by policies which tried to affect
worker conduct. According to a recent Wisconsin study, nearly 45 per cent of
the industrial accidents in their sample were due to disfunctional acts by
workers (what might have been called contributory negligence), while less than
25 per cent were due to identifiable physical hazards.2 2 Accident re-
searchers agree that both work environment and worker behavior are
important contributing factors, but without good empirical evidence, they can-
not agree on the relative importance of each. In formulating industrial safety
policies, we have shied away from policies that try to impose costs on dis-
functional acts by workers.23 If the workers' estimate of the private accident
and accident prevention costs to them are below the social costs, there is a
clear possibility that they will not exercise enough care, resulting in higher
equilibrium injury risks.
21 In chapter 4, Surry provides us with a summary of numerous studies that relate work in-
jury rates to the physical health and psychological attributes of workers under various environ-
mental conditions. J. SuRRY, supra note 20. Some studies relate smoking, alcoholism, and drugs
to the incidence of industrial accidents, and I suspect that these factors are even more closely
correlated with the incidence of occupational diseases. If my suspicion is correct, it raises an
interesting legal issue; can an employer be sued for discriminatory hiring practices if he denies
employment to a worker who smokes? Some data contained in a brief report by Simonds suggests
that a firm's overall injury rate is inversely correlated with the percentage of its labor force that
is married; that is, single and divorced individuals may be innately less safe. Simonds, OSHA
Compliance: "Safety Is Good Business", 50 PERSONNEL, July-Aug. 1973, at 30. Before I believe this
conjecture, I would very much want to control for other variables such as age, sex, length of
time on the job, and occupation.
22See WISCONSIN STATE DEP'T OF LABOR, INDUSTRY, AND HUMAN RELATIONS, INSPECTION
EFFECTIVENESS REPORT (1971). In the conclusions to this study, the authors propose that since
inspections can only correct easily identifiable hazards like the absence of a safety guard (and
if the guard is removable, the inspections cannot compel the firm always to use the guard; that is,
physical hazards are often transitory in nature), a policy of safety instruction and information
to workers might be more effective in lowering the frequency of work-related injuries.
23 Aside from exceptions under union contracts and firm-initiated supplemental fringe
benefits, the wage losses due to disabling work injuries are typically shared under current state
workmen's compensation laws. I believe that there are at least two reasons why public policies
do not try to control injury risks by increasing the share of accident costs borne by the worker
or by imposing minimum negligence standards on worker conduct. First, such policies often
involve a conflict between the objectives of equitable compensation to victims and reduction of
industrial accidents. Second, the administrative and enforcement costs of a minimum negligence
standard on worker conduct may be (or at least imagined to be) inordinately high. One could
add a possible third reason, namely that such policies which try to affect worker behavior are likely
to be ineffective anyway.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The model of equilibrium injury rates set forth here is one of partial equi-
librium. A more sophisticated model has been developed by Thaler and
Rosen.2 4 Given some risk structure of wage costs, W = W(iw), each worker
is assumed to choose that combination of a wage rate and injury risk that
maximizes his expected utility. The distribution of workers who confront
different risks .r thus depends on worker preferences and the shape of the
risk structure of wages W(r). Conversely, given any risk structure W(17)
firms choose that combination of (W,7r) which, given their accident pre-
vention functions, maximizes profits. The supply prices of workers reflect-
ing their risk premiums for added risks, and the offer prices of firms which
reflect their ability to avoid accident costs, jointly determine an equilibrium
risk structure of wage rates, W = W(7r).25 Neither my model nor the Thaler-
Rosen model adequately copes with the general equilibrium problem. If
consumer preferences shift so that at prevailing "prices" consumers want
garbage collected thrice weekly, this increase in consumer demands will
lead to more industrial accidents as more workers are attracted into the
hazardous industry of refuse collection. When the private and social costs of
accidents and accident prevention are the same (as viewed by employers and
workers), the rise in disabling work injuries due to a larger demand for gar-
bage collection will be socially optimal.
III
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
Good empirical studies are neither necessary nor sufficient for the
evolution of public policy. Sensational reports about tragic events and
anecdotal evidence are often more effective in eliciting legislative action.
Indeed, the paucity of pertinent and reliable data poses a serious problem
for anyone even attempting to measure accident and accident prevention
costs. The published injury statistics are, however, quite informative and re-
veal some striking empirical regularities. In this section, I present some of
these empirical regularities and try to interpret them in the light of a model
of equilibrium injury risks.26 Two caveats about the published data are in
order before beginning: work injuries are defined according to the Z16.1
standard, 27 and the reporting of injury data to the Bureau of Labor Statistics
24 R. Thaler & S. Rosen, supra note 7.
2' The Thaler-Rosen model is based on a theory of hedonic prices developed by Rosen. Rosen,
Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82 J. POL. EcoN. 34
(1974). In equilibrium, W = W(ir) must be an increasing function of 1r; that is, W'(ir) > 0.
Some writers such as O'Connell assert that even fully informed workers do not trade-off higher
wages for larger injury risks. According to O'Connell, workers are deterred from hazardous jobs
only by the fear of injury. O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability Insurance for All Kinds of Accidents:
A Proposal, INs. L.J., Sept. 1973, at 495. As I remarked in the Introduction, one cannot identify
the underlying motives by asking workers why they chose particular jobs.
26 The materials here are mainly condensed from two earlier studies, Oi, supra note 7; Oi, Eco-
nomic and Empirical Aspects of Industrial Safety (forthcoming, currently on file with the author).
27 See note 1 supra. Under nearly all state laws, a compensable work injury is one "arising
out of and in the normal course of employment" which is a superficially straightforward def-
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prior to 1971 was entirely voluntary. 28 It has been argued that the Z16.1
standard grossly understated the true number of work injuries, while the
voluntary reporting induced some measurement errors.29 While the BLS in-
jury statistics undoubtedly do contain measurement errors, they neverthe-
less appear to be sufficiently accurate for our purpose-description of the
major variations in work injury rates.
A. Secular Trends in Work Injury Rates
Attention is first directed to the data on accidental deaths. According to
the National Safety Council, accidents of all types accounted for 6 per cent
of all deaths in 1970.30 The overall accidental death rate per 100,000 popula-
tion (including motor vehicles, home, and work) fell from 80.8 in 1929 to
56.0 in 1970. 31 The secular decline was even sharper for the work fatality
rate per 100,000 employed persons which fell from 42.0 to 18.1 between 1929
and 1970.32 One of every five accidental deaths in 1929 occurred at work, and
this figure was one in every eight by 1970.33 Improvements in medicine and
industrial safety, as well as a changing composition of employed persons, all
contributed to this sharp reduction in industrial fatalities.
The conclusion that there has been a substantial secular improvement in
industrial safety is confirmed by the total work injury frequency rate for all
manufacturing for the period 1926-60. The conclusion does not stand up as
well when the data are extended to 1970 or when they are disaggregated. In
Table I, the BLS injury rate data for selected industries over the period
1949-70 is presented. Some industries, such as logging and highway con-
struction, have exhibited steady reductions in injury rates while others, such
as meat packing and retail trade, have become more hazardous over time.
While explanations may be attempted for trends in specific industries-for
example, construction has become safer because of the mechanization of
many materials handling and lifting operations-such attempts do not come to
grips with a model of equilibrium injury rates. In addition to these secular
trends, Kossoris has shown that there is a definite cyclical pattern.34
inition. An example illustrates the complexities not only with respect to the compilation of statis-
tics but also to the litigations over contested claims. In climbing out of his car, Smith steps on a rock
and sprains his ankle. If his car was parked in a lot that was owned or leased by his employer
for the use of employees, Smith's sprain is a compensable work injury. However, if Smith parked
his car in a public parking lot, the sprained ankle-cannot be included as a work injury statistic
and is ineligible for any compensation benefits. -
28 The BLS data on employment, hours, and earnings are also based on establishment reports
that are voluntarily supplied to BLS. The industry-wide aggregates and averages that are published
are, however, weighted sums and means where sampling methods are employed in deriving
the weights.29 J.B. GORDON, A. AKMAN &,.M. BRooxs, INDUSTRIAL SAFETY STATISTICS: A RE-EXAMINATION
(1971).
30 NATIONAL SAFETY COJNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 18 (1970).
31 Id. More detailed- data for intervening years as well as the age/sex breakdown of work
fatalities can be found in Oi, supra note 7, at 101-02, Tables 5.1 & 5.2.
32 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS (1970).
33 Id.
34 Kossoris, Changes in Injury Frequency Rates and Employment in Manufacturing, 1936-41, 56
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 949 (1943); Kossoris, Industrial Injuries and the Business Cycle, 46 MONTHLY LAB.
REv. 579 (1938).
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Work injury rates are positively correlated with economic activity, rising in
the upswing and falling in the downswing. s5
TABLE I
INJURY FREQUENCY RATES FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES, 1949-70
(rates per million man-hours)
Industry 1949 1960 1965 1970
Manufacturing 15.0 12.0 12.8 15.2
Meat packing 23.2 25.4 35.4 46.9
Canning and preserving 20.8 22.6 23.1 25.7
Logging 92.2 58.8 52.6 42.4
Structural clay products 36.8 31.1 32.8 30.5
Motor vehicles 6.7 3.3 2.3 2.0
Non-manufacturing
Highway construction 45.5 35.0 30.6 28.9
Public warehousing 31.2 28.8 26.0 31.1
Bnkfig 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.4
Retail general merchandise 5.1 6.8 7.8 8.0
Source: U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1735,
HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1972, at 361, Table 163 (1972); U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1016, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STA-
TISTICS, 1950 EDITION 180, Table G-4 (1951).
Historical data for all manufacturing from Table G-3 were as follows:
1926 24.2
1930 23.1
1935 17.9
1940 15.3
1945 18.6
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1016, HANDBOOK
OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1950 EDITION 179 (1951).
B. The Industrial Dispersion of Injury Rates
The data appearing in several special BLS studies of specific industries
suggest that the dispersion of work injury risks across occupations within
a given industry is considerably larger than the dispersion of industry-wide
rates across industries. However, since the available data are reported on an
industry basis, researchers have emphasized the industrial dispersion.
3' It is beyond the scope of this paper to try to explain the mixed patterns exhibited by the time
series data where injury frequency rates are falling in some industries, rising in others, and following
other time paths in still other industries. Berkowitz has argued that the secular decline in the injury
rate for manufacturing is a response to the rising cost of industrial accidents. Berkowitz, Alloca-
tion Effects of Workmen's Compensation, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL WINTER MEETING 342 (1971). However, his measure
of the accident cost is the real wage rate (the ratio of average hourly earnings in manufacturing
to the consumer price index). His model cannot explain the reversal in the trend from 1960
to 1970, nor can it explain the rising trend in meat packing or canning and preserving. Although
Smith provides us with a somewhat better model, Smith, Intertemporal Changes in Work Injury
Rate, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH
ANNIVERSARY (ANNUAL WINTER) MEETING 167 (1973), I have argued that we still do not have
a satisfactory model which explains the time series variations in work injury rates. Oi, supra
note 26, pt. III.
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Anyone who has studied the BLS injury statistics knows the magnitude
of the industrial dispersion. To cite but a few figures, the injury rates per
million man-hours in 1970 were 2.4 in banking, 63.9 in refuse collection, 8.0
in retail trade. Further, the time series data exhibit a strong autocorrelation;
that is, the high injury rate industries in 1960 were also the high injury rate
industries in 1970. Given the strong temporal stability in the ranking of in-
dustries by injury frequency rate, workers should have fairly good ideas about
relative injury risks.36
C. Age and Sex Differentials
That the incidence of industrial accidents is systematically related to the
age and sex of the worker has been empirically established.3 7 By using the
work injury and employment data for California, estimates of injury fre-
quency rates per 1,000 employed persons by sex for eight age groups have
been constructed. These data for 1960 and 1968 are presented in Table II.
If the injury rates for the youngest and oldest age groups are ignored,38
Table II reveals a clear age profile of male injury rates which fall with in-
creasing age. The injury rate in 1968 for 20-24 year old males was roughly
twice as high as that of males 45 and older. The female age profiles are
essentially flat tending to rise slightly with age. It will also be noticed that
over all ages, males are three times as likely to be injured at work as females.
TABLE I
NON-FATAL INJURY RATES BY AGE AND SEX:
CALIFORNIA, 1960 AND 1968
(rate per thousand employed persons)
Males Females
Age Group 1960 1968 1960 1968
14-17 19.1 17.6 5.3 5.1
18-19 52.2 54.6 9.4 11.0
20-24 50.6 50.2 9.2 11.0
25-34 37.1 39.8 10.8 11.7
35-44 31.0 29.9 11.7 12.3
45-54 29.1 26.2 13.2 13.6
55-64 26.7 25.5 12.4 12.1
65 and over 16.0 13.2 7.1 6.6
All Ages 34.8 34.5 12.0 12.4
Source: Constructed from data in CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF INDUSTRIAL RE-
LATIONS, CAUFORNIA WORK INJURIES (1970); 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION pt. 6, § 2, at 2117, Table 187 (1973).
36 They may not be able to express their estimates in terms of injury frequency rates, severity
rates, or probabilities, but they probably know that on the average, trucking and fire prevention
involve more hazards than say auto assembly or aluminum extrusions. In the Michigan Survey
Research Center study, there was a close positive correlation across industries between the workers'
perception of injury risks and the percentage of workers actually injured. MICHIGAN SURVEY
RESEARCH CENTER, SURVEY OF WORKING CONDITIONS (1970).37 See, e.g., J.B. GoRDON, A. AKMAN & M. BROOMS, supra note 29; Kossoris, Relation of Age
to Industrial Injuries, 51 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 789 (1940).
3s The injury rates of Table II are not comparable to the BLS rates per million man-hours
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The total injury frequency rates conceal the composition of work in-
juries. At least two studies have shown that the percentage of serious injuries
climbs with age. According to the 1965 California data, the work fatality
rate per 100,000 employed persons was only 14.4 for the 20-24 age group
compared to an overall fatality rate of 19.5; the rate for the 50-54 age group
was 21.6 .39 Data from workmen's compensation files for New York City for
1955-56 have been used to estimate a truly serious injury frequency rate of
1.45 per million man-hours which ranged from 1.14 for the 20-24 age group
to 1.92 for the 45-49 age group.40 The nimble young man is far likelier to be
injured at work, but his health and youth somehow enable him to avoid
being seriously maimed or killed.
The observed age/sex differentials in work injury rates revealed by
Table II (and corroborated by other data sets) could have been generated by sev-
eral structural forces. Age and sex can properly be viewed as proxy variables that
happen to be correlated with systematic differences in such causal factors as (1) in-
nate accident liability, (2) perceived costs of work injuries, (3) attitudes toward
risk-bearing, (4) occupational and industrial affiliation, or (5) job experience.
The first explanation argues that, other things being equal (the industry, oc-
cupation, firm, safety of the work site, fellow workers, and so on), certain
workers are innately more liable to be involved in industrial accidents. Most
safety researchers reject the thesis of accident proneness, 4I but it is difficult
to separate reckless behavior, job inexperience, and misperceptions of acci-
dent costs from an innate attribute of accident proneness. I am unaware of
any empirical study which has convincingly presented a test of the hypothesis
that the innate injury risks are the same for young versus old males or males
versus females.
According to a second model, workers distribute themselves across jobs
of varying riskiness by weighing the benefits of higher pay (due to risk pre-
miums) against their perceived costs of being injured, C = 7ry. Individuals
with lower perceived costs (due either to a low subjective estimate of the
injury risk ir or a low cost of being injured y) will tend to be concentrated
in the more hazardous jobs. Bits of casual evidence lend some support to this
model. The ratio of serious to total work injuries and the duration of tem-
porary disability both rise with increasing age implying that the cost per
injury y will be higher for older workers. The allegation that young men are
more reckless and embrace a philosophy of "those things happen to the other
of exposure. If the California rates per 1,000 workers are divided by two (1,000 employee years
are approximately equal to two million man-hours), the California rates can be converted to the
BLS measure of injury frequency rates. To the extent that the youngest, 14-17, and oldest, 65
and over, age groups contain larger fractions of part-time employees, average annual man-hours
per employee will be lower imparting a downward bias in the injury frequency rate per million
man-hours. I assume that the variations in annual man-hours per employee across the six middle
groups is small.
39 These data were compiled by Gordon and his co-workers, J.B. GORDON, A. AKMAN & M.
BROOKS, supra note 29, and were reproduced in Oi, supra note 7, at 94.40jaffe & Day, Some Illustrative Rate Tables on Seriously Disabling Work Injuries, in BuREAU OF
APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND VOCA-
TIONAL REHABILITATION 83 (A. Jaffe ed. 1973).
41 See J. SURRY, supra note 20, at 155-68, for a critical discussion of this point.
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guy," suggests that they would underestimate injury risks. The model is,
however, less plausible in explaining the sex differential.
That individuals differ in their attitudes toward risk-bearing is surely
correct. Other things being equal, risk averse workers would choose safer
jobs even though this meant lower but more stable wage incomes. Individ-
uals in our economy express their attitudes toward risk-bearing in many
ways, of which their choice of more or less risky employment is but one.
The behavior of young males suggests that they have the least risk aversion
and may indeed prefer risk. They drive fast, ride motorcycles, engage in
crime, and buy little insurance relative to older males and females. Choosing
riskier jobs fits into this general behavioral pattern, but its quantitative
importance is a matter of conjecture.
The industrial and occupational distribution of female workers is very
different from that of males. Females are more heavily concentrated in the
safer clerical jobs, and even as blue-collar workers in manufacturing they
tend to be in the safer industries. Aggregation over these different distribu-
tions could thus generate a substantial sex differential in economy-wide
injury rates even if the injury risks were the same for the two sexes in each
industry and occupation. 42 But this explanation fails to answer tbh question of
why females end up in the safer industries. A complete analysis must develop
a theory of occupational choice in which injury risk is only one of several
factors. 43 I had initially conjectured that part of the difference in injury rates
between young and old male workers might be due to differences in the
industrial distribution of employment. An examination of the California
injury data revealed, however, that the shapes of the age profile (with injury
rates monotonically declining with age) were the same in contract construc-
tion, manufacturing, and transportation/public utilities. 44
Finally, age and sex differentials in work injury rates may be due to age
and sex differences in job experience. In the next section the empirical ev-
idence showing that injury risks are higher for new, inexperienced workers
is discussed. To the extent that labor turnover rates are higher for young
males, they will, on average, have less job experience and hence confront
higher injury risks.
D. Labor Turnover and Injury Risks
Labor turnover provides us with what I regard as the most convincing
explanation for the cyclical fluctuations in work injury rates. A simple learn-
ing model could generate an inverse relationship between injury risks and
job experience as measured by the length of time that a worker has been on
42 Surry cites several wartime studies of injury risks on manufacturing production jobs, welders,
assembly, and so forth. These showed that given job experience, females, if anything, had higher
work injury rates. Id. at 13. It would be useful to assemble more recent data to verify this finding.
43 Comparative advantage must surely influence job choices. Men are relatively better at jobs
requiring physical strength. Sex discrimination may affect not only pay for the same job but also
availability of types of jobs; employers may simply refuse to hire women for hazardous jobs.
44 It should be pointed out that the heights of the age profiles differed, being higher in con-
struction. The estimated injury frequency rates can be found in Oi, supra note 26, at Table 2.5.
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a particular job. Given the characteristics of the work environment and fellow
workers, industrial accidents result from errors by the worker. Newly hired
workers who are unfamiliar with their jobs and the peculiarities of the work
site are far more likely to commit errors of which some will result in disabling
injuries. As they gain experience, the frequency of errors (and hence injuries)
falls. The direct empirical evidence indicates that the injury rates of workers
with one month of job experience are one and a half to two times as high as
the rates for workers with six months of job experience. 4 5 Implications with
respect to both cross-sectional and time series variations in injury rates can
be derived from this inverse relationship.
An increase in the accession rate during a period of rising employment
means that the firm's labor force will, on average, have less job experience,
implying an increase in the overall work injury rate. Most time series re-
gression models do, indeed, reveal significant positive correlations between
the injury frequency rate and the accession (or new hires) rate even when
other variables are included in the equation. 46 These time series regressions
provide additional indirect evidence supporting the hypothesis that job ex-
perience (which is related to labor turnover) is an important factor.
The cross-sectional implications are even more suggestive. Consider two
firms in the same industry with identical joint production functions. Firm A
adopts personnel policies which reduce labor turnover so that inexperienced
workers with less than one year of job experience comprise only 10 per cent
of A's labor force.47 Conversely, firm B with its higher turnover rate ends up
with 40 per cent inexperienced workers. If the injury rate of inexperienced
workers is twice as high as that of experienced, the injury rate for firm B's
labor force will be 27.3 per cent higher than that of A. Although the height
and shape of the relationship between injury rates and job experience will
depend on the technology of production, safety outlays, and so on, part of
45 Using data from two earlier studies, L. CHANEY & H. HANNA, THE SAFETY MOVEMENT IN THE
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY, 1907 TO 1917 (BLS Bull. No. 234, 1918), and Van Zelst, The Effect
of Age and Experience on Accident Rate, 38 J. App. PSYCH. 313 (1954), Surry depicts these inverse
relationships for two industrial plants. J. SuRRY, supra note 20, at 14. It is not a surprising empirical
finding. The faculty advisor to a student sailing club informed me that "[i]f a kid is going to tip
over a boat, 95 times out of 100, he'll do it within the first 300 yards from the dock." We do not
have the requisite data to determine an appropriate measure ofjob experience. Is it the individual's
time on a specific job with a particular firm, his experience in a particular occupation (for example,
lathe operator), or simply general work experience in the labor force? It should also be noticed
that the existence of a stable inverse relationship between injury rates and job experience would
generate age differentials wherein younger workers suffer higher work injury rates.
46 A regression model for the manufacturing sector can be found in Smith, supra note 35,
and for two-digit manufacturing industries in Oi, supra note 26, at pt. III. My preliminary results
suggest that the response of injury rates to changes in the accession rate differs across industries;
this latter finding is not surprising if different industries confront different joint production
functions for injuries and goods.
47 Personal attributes such as marital status, sex, age, and so on may be closely correlated
with job tenure. If so, a firm could affect its turnover rate by adopting a selective (possibly dis-
criminatory) hiring policy. Pencavel and Oi have argued that a firm can reduce turnover by paying
higher wages. See J. PENCAVEL, AN ANALYSIS OF THE QUIT RATE IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
(1970); Oi, supra note 18. It is my understanding that under the 1973 United Auto Workers
contracts, new workers who remained with the company for six months would be rewarded by
pay incentives. This feature was introduced by management for the express purpose of reducing
the high costs of labor turnover.
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the high injury rates in logging or canning and preserving is undoubtedly
due to the seasonal nature of employment resulting in high labor turnover
rates. Previous attempts to measure the costs of labor turnover have ignored
the fact that accident costs are positively correlated with labor turnover. The
implementation of policies that encourage lower labor turnover may, in the
end, be even more effective in reducing industrial accidents than federally
mandated safety standards and inspections.
E. The Establishment Size Profile
A number of researchers have directed our attention to the wide dis-
persion in work injury rates across establishment size categories. 4 In a
recent study49 I found that, except for printing and publishing, the relation-
ship between injury rates and establishment size (hereafter called the establish-
ment size profile) for the twenty two-digit manufacturing industries" could
be described by either (1) an inverted U-shaped curve with the smallest and
largest establishments reporting lower injury rates or (2) a monotonically
declining curve with the largest establishments being the safest. The magni-
tudes of the injury rate differentials were impressively large. These size pro-
files for five industries (based on unpublished BLS data for the period 1968-
70) are presented in Table II. In the primary metals industry, workers in
establishments with 50 to 99 employees suffered an injury frequency rate
that was 19 times larger than that of workers in establishments with 2,500
or more employees; the corresponding ratio in transportation equipment was
16. It has been alleged that, under the Z16.1 standard, the reported injury
statistics for large firms were biased downward because workers with minor
injuries were simply transferred to less arduous jobs within the same large
firm and were never- reported as being injured. If true, the percentage of
serious injuries (which excludes temporary disabilities of 1-3 days duration)
should be higher for larger firms. The data in the bottom panel of Table III
tend to confirm this allegation, but the magnitude of the differences in these
percentages is small.
The shape and dispersion of injury rate differentials are maintained
when the data are disaggregated into finer industry classifications. The
injury rate differentials across size categories within an industry are fre-
quently larger than the injury rate differentials across industries holding
establishment size constant. The mixed pattern of these profiles (most ex-
hibiting the inverted U-shape and a large minority exhibiting the declining
4 8 See, e.g., J. SuRRY, supra note 20; Russell, supra note 19.
49 Oi, supra note 26.
50 The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) was developed to promote "uniformity and
comparability in the presentation of statistical data collected by various agencies of the United
States Government, State agencies, trade associations, and private research organizations."
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL
CLASSIFICATION MANUAL, 1972, at 9 (1972). The classification makes use of a numerical scheme
to differentiate among industries depending on the level of detail required; there are eleven
divisions (A-K) which are further divided into major groups (two-digit codes), industry groups
(three-digit codes), and industries (four-digit codes).
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profile) reveals that workers in the smallest establishments do not always
confront the largest injury risks.
TABLE III
INJURY FREQUENCY RATE AND PERCENTAGE OF SERIOUS INJURIES
(by establishment size for five industries, 1968-70)
Establishment with Textile Primary Transportation
an Avg. Employment Food Mills Metals Machinery Equipment
20. 22. 33. 35. 37.
Injury frequency rate Y
(per million man-hours)
1-19 17.90 9.27 30.13 15.10 25.97
20-49 27.00 13.00 46.97 20.20 32.67
50-99 32.67 15.60 53.60 22.53 35.80
100-249 32.97 16.87 47.17 23.87 34.87
250-499 30.83 11.93 34.97 19.67 23.73
500-999 20.97 7.33 19.13 14.47 14.77
1,000-2,499 19.17 5.97 10.10 12.90 8.47
2.500 or more 16.90 3.63 2.73 5.07 2.83
Percentage of
serious injuries S
1-19 61.9 63.4 61.8 71.6 51.4
20-49 56.9 66.7 59.4 55.0 55.8
50-99 57.1 61.0 60.9 56.2 52.7
100-249 62.2 69.0 65.1 59.1 59.4
250-499 64.1 71.1 71.9 65.2 70.6
500-999 71.9 76.0 79.3 68.9 74.9
1,000-2,499 76.1 77.2 86.9 73.4 77.0
2,500 or more 66.9 76.1 86.3 84.9 90.6
Source: Oi, Economic and
on file with the author).
Empirical Aspects of Industrial Safety (forthcoming, currently
Several hypotheses can be advanced to explain the lower injury frequency
rates for larger establishments. The larger manufacturing establishments
may (1) have lower labor turnover rates, (2) have larger fractions of em-
ployees in the safer clerical and sales occupations, (3) hire fewer young
males, (4) substitute capital for labor in particularly dangerous operations,
and so on. Further, in the context of the model outlined in Part II, the larger
firms may be more efficient in producing accident prevention or may con-
front a higher marginal accident cost curve. We do not have published
data by establishment size on labor turnover rates and the composition of
employed persons51 thereby precluding meaningful tests for the first set of
hypotheses. We have some fragmentary data for New York on the inputs of
safety and medical personnel. According to the 1972 New York data for all
51 Data on the percentage of workers in nonproduction jobs (mainly supervisory, clerical,
ard sales) are available by size from the Census of Manufactures. I had anticipated that the larger
the percentage of workers in the safe nonproduction jobs, the lower would be the injury rate
for all workers. A regression model to test this hypothesis yielded implausible results generally
opposing my prior anticipations. See Oi, supra note 26, at Table 4.6. The broad categories of pro-
duction versus nonproduction workers may conceal a considerable heterogeneity of the detailed
occupations and jobs within each.
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industries, 52 15.0 per cent of all establishments employed some safety per-
sonnel. The percentage climbs with establishment size rising from 7.6 per
cent for establishments with 100-249 employees to 37.5 per cent for estab-
lishments with 10,000 or more employees. The 1,023 respondents who had
some safety personnel employed a total of 2,033 safety workers of whom
only 38.8 per cent were classified as safety engineers or industrial hygienists.
In addition, the ratio of safety workers to all employees (adjusted for the
percentage of establishments with safety personnel) fell with increasing size.
If there are increasing returns to safety personnel, the New York data could
help to explain the lower injury rates of larger firms, but the implied pro-
ductivity of safety workers is implausibly large. Finally, I am unable to ex-
plain the lower injury rates for the smallest establishments with the available
data on the input of safety personnel and the percentage of nonproduction
workers. 53
TABLE IV
INJURY FREQUENCY RATES FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES
(rates per million man-hours)
Industry 1960 1965 1970
Five target industries
176 Roofing and sheet metal work 40.8 45.9 43.0
201 Meat products 29.3 37.0 43.1
24 Lumber and wood products 38.0 36.0 34.1
379 Misc. transportation equipment - 31.6 33.3
4463 Marine cargo handling - 68.8 -
Other industries
161 Highway and street construction 35.0 30.6 28.9
203 Canned and preserved fruits and 22.6 23.1 25.7
vegetables
371 Motor vehicles and equipment 5.2 4.7 5.3
3732 Boat building and repairing 29.5 36.1 35.2
422 Public warehousing 28.8 26.0 31.1
9349 Refuse collection 46.7 53.8 63.9
9390 Police 34.1 43.1 45.6
9390p Fire protection 33.4 31.4 41.7
Source: U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1735, HANDBOOK
OF LABOR STATISTICS 1972, at 361, Table 163 (1972).
Under the OSHA inspection program, five target industries have been
singled out as being especially hazardous. The basis for choosing these in-
dustries is unclear. Table IV presents the published BLS injury rates for the
52 The New York data was based on 6,836 voluntary responses to a mail survey of establish-
ments employing 100 or more employees. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF LABOR, HEALTH AND
SAFETY PERSONNEL IN INDUSTRY IN NEW YORK STATE (1972). These data are reproduced in Oi,
supra note 26, at Table 4.10.
53 The presumably close personal relationships between employer and employees in the smallest
establishments has been offered as a conjectural hypothesis to explain the inverted U-shaped
size profile. That worker moral and the social climate of the work environment matter has been
studied by psychologists.
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five target industries as well as rates for other arbitrarily selected industries.
If one looks only at these industry-wide averages, the injury rates in the target
industries are well above the national average for all industries which, in
1970, probably involved an injury rate of 12 to 14 per million man-hours.
In addition to local government enterprises such as refuse collection, police,
and fire protection which are shown in Table IV, many of the mining in-
dustries entail risks that are considerably higher than those included in the
target group. 54 Furthermore, the use of industry membership as the basis
for inclusion in a target group can be misleading. In 1970, the injury fre-
quency rate for blast furnaces (SIC 331) was only 6.5, but employees in
establishments with 50 to 99 employees suffered an injury rate of
48.7.
TABLE V
INJURY STATISTICS FOR THE FIvE TARGET INDUSTRIES: 1966-70*
(classified by establishment size)
Estabs. with Avg. Employment of:
Industry 1-99 100-999 1,000 All Sizes
or more
Total injury frequency rate F
176 Roofing and sheet metal work 44.66 22.99 - 38.38
201 Meat products 42.36 44.83 28.78 39.32
24 Lumber and wood products 42.83 32.91 11.96 35.24
379 Misc. transp. equipment 38.29 35.54 11.37 35.81
4463 Marine cargo handling 54.17 63.90 69.20 62.69
Serious injury frequency rate Z
176 Roofing and sheet metal work 26.72 12.44 - 22.58
201 Meat products 23.39 27.57 18.61 24.00
24 Lumber and wood products 28.02 23.53 9.33 23.89
379 Misc. transp. equipment 20.57 20.91 8.53 20.49
4463 Marine cargo handling 42.59 58.10 66.30 56.15
Fatality rate D
176 Roofing and sheet metal work .206 .081 - .170
201 Meat products .029 .041 .024 .034
24 Lumber and wood products .227 .136 .149 .173
379 Misc. transp. equipment .061 .128 0 .103
4463 Marine cargo handling .081 .153 .193 .144
Source: Unpublished files, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor.
*AIl rates are per million man-hours of exposure. The rates for "All Sizes" are weighted
averages based on the man-hours data in the raw sample counts. The fatality rates D per million
man-hours can be converted to fatality rates per 100,000 employed persons by multiplying them
by 200 for all industries, the fatality rate per million man-hours in 1966-70 was around D = .09.
In Table V, I present data on (1) the total injury frequency rate F, (2)
the serious injury frequency rate Z which excludes temporary disabilities
of one to three days, and (3) the death or fatality rate D per million man-hours of
54 Safety in mining is under the control of the Department of the Interior and is thus outside
of the jurisdiction of OSHA. Hence, mining industries do not appear in the target group.
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exposure for three broad size groups in the five target industries.55 When the
data were disaggregated into eight size categories, the size profiles of total
and serious injury rates followed an inverted U-shape in four industries.
The exception was marine cargo handling in which the injury rates (F,Z)
tended to climb with increasing firm size. If the voluntary samples can be
regarded as random samples, the fraction of total employment in large es-
tablishments (with 1,000 or more employees) is considerably smaller in these
target industries.56 Since the largest firms also happen to be the safest in
nearly all industries, the smaller average firm size may account for the high
industry-wide injury rates. The injury rate differentials between the largest
firms (with 1,000 or more employees) and the rest of the industry are sub-
stantial-between a half to a third of the rates for the smaller firms. As I
noted earlier, we still do not have a satisfactory explanation for these wide
discrepancies in injury risks across size categories within the same industry.
Finally, numerous other empirical regularities can be found in the liter-
ature on industrial safety. There is, for example, a diurnal cycle of injury
rates wherein work injury risks are highest in the mid-morning and mid-
afternoon. Physical fatigue is not a significant factor. The interested reader
is strongly encouraged to consult Surry for further details on other factors
related to work injury risks.57
IV
PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD INDUSTRIAL SAFETY
Legislative actions over the last decade appear to embrace as fact that
if left to themselves, competitive labor markets would generate equilibrium
injury rates that are, in some sense, non-optimal. 58 In this section, the theory
" The injury rates shown in Table V are weighted averages of the raw sample data for the
period 1966-70. To the extent that the percentage of establishments in each size category which
voluntarily supplied injury data to BLS may vary, the weighted averages for "All Sizes" may differ
from the published BLS statistics.
'6 Based on data from I U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1967 CENSUS OF
MANUFACTURES ch. 2, Table 2 (1971), 32.8 per cent of all employees in all manufacturing industries
were in establishments with 1,000 or more employees. The sample data for the five years, 1966-70,
indicated the following percentages of employment in establishments with 1,000 or more em-
ployees in the five target industries:
Industry Per centin 1,000 +
size group
176 Roofing and sheet metal work 0
201 Meat products 31.6
24 Lumber and wood 11.2
379 Misc. trans. equipment 2.5
4463 Marine cargo handling 6.8
Id., ch. 2, Table 3.
57J. SuRRY, supra note 20.
58 It is unclear whether the legislators' concept of optimal work injury risks is the same as that
of the economists; that is, injury risks that minimize the sum of accident and accident prevention
costs. There are reasons to suspect that the legislators' concept of optimality is some normative
concept in which their legislatively perceived "costs" of disabling injuries and diseases far exceed
the social "costs."
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and evidence developed above are used to analyze two developments:5 9
(1) the recommendations of the NCSWCL with respect to the scope of covered
employment and the levels of benefit payments to disabled workers, and
(2) programs designed to increase industrial safety which have been adopted
by OSHA pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.
A. Benefits and Coverage Under Workmen's Compensation
Workmen's compensation is basically a system of compulsory no-fault
insurance. If an injury is classified as a compensable work injury, the em-
ployer is liable for part of the injured worker's accident costs for medical
care, rehabilitation, and wage losses irrespective of who was at fault. Further,
the employer is legally compelled to assure the funds for his share of the
cost by purchasing insurance from a state insurance fund, private insurance
carriers, and for the largest firms, via self-insurance. In return, the employer's
liability is ordinarily limited to fixed schedules of benefit payments prescribed
under the particular law.60 Although the vast majority of workers are pres-
ently covered under state or federal workmen's compensation laws, the
NCSWCL Report recommended that the scope of covered employment should
be expanded to include agricultural workers, domestic servants, and em-
ployees of small firms presently excluded. The administrative and transaction
costs of expanding coverage are large, and if these administrative costs are
included in the cost of accident prevention, 61 it is probable that the NCSWCL
proposal for expanded coverage would not lower the sum of accident and
accident prevention costs.
By linking premium costs to the firm's industrial accident experience,
workmen's compensation is supposed to give employers an incentive to pre-
vent accidents. The higher the share of accident costs to victims that is borne
by employers, the greater is this supposed incentive. This argument tacitly
assumes that in the absence of workmen's compensation, differences in
accident costs will not be reflected in the structure of wage costs facing
employers with different injury risks. In this event, the marginal accident
cost curve, C'a in Figure 3 above, will be flat (because W'(ir) = 0
meaning no risk premiums) so that employers have less to gain from invest-
ing in accident prevention. The validity of this argument depends on answers
to two empirical questions. (1) Are differences in injury risks reflected in
the structure of wage costs, W = W(wr), with riskier jobs commanding
higher risk premiums? (2) How does the provision of compulsory work-
men's compensation insurance affect W(,r)?
19 The historical facts surrounding the evolution of state workmen's compensation laws and
the details and programs under recent state and federal legislation are obviously also important,
but are subjects beyond the scope of this paper.
60 If the injured party can prove that the employer was at fault, he can sue for additional
damages in a private legal suit. The employer, however, waives his common law defenses of
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant doctrine. Even under work-
men's compensation, litigations may arise about which injuries or diseases are "compensable."
The issue is especially difficult in cases involving industrial diseases.
61 Calabresi calls them the costs of secondary cost avoidance. G. GALABRESI, supra note 6.
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Several recent studies have shown that when the effects on wages of
age, sex, race, education, and experience are controlled in a regression
model, wage rates are systematically higher in occupations or industries that
entail larger work injury risks. According to Thaler and Rosen, if the fatality
risks could be reduced, the lower risk premium component in wages implies
a value to saving a life of roughly $250,000.62 Gordon found that the wage
differentials across different Glass I railroads were roughly equal to the
actuarial value of differences in wage losses due to different injury risks
across railroads. 63 Although wage rates paid to workers differ from wage
costs (by the amount of the fringe benefits and supplements), these studies
strongly support the existence of a risk structure of wages, W = W(ir) with
W' (0r) > 0.
Protection against the contingent costs of disabling work injuries can be
provided by either public or private insurance. Workmen's compensation
and Social Security are the two principal sources of public insurance. If these
fail to cover all accident costs, they can be supplemented by private insurance
purchased either by the individual worker or by his employer. For a variety
of reasons, the difference between total employee compensation (wage
costs) and wage payments to workers has increased over time with much
of the growth attributable to employer-financed supplements in the form of
group health, accident, and life insurance for their employees. 64 It is surely
reasonable to suppose that public and private insurance are very close sub-
stitutes. If they were perfect substitutes, an increase in public insurance
coverage via higher legislated benefit payments would be accompanied by a
decrease in private insurance. In this event, more compulsory public in-
surance under workmen's compensation would have little effect on the risk
structure of wage costs, W = W(r). However, when workers initially had
no private insurance, and risk premiums did not fully cover the actuarial
costs of different injury risks, the imposition of more public insurance may
have had the desired effect of internalizing accident costs.
The efficacy of more public insurance as a means of lowering the in-
dustrial accident toll has also been questioned by Chelius.65 Benefit levels
and hence premium costs for workmen's compensation vary widely across
states. If the theory behind the NCSWCL proposal is correct, one
should find that injury rates for firms in high-benefit states should be lower
than those for firms in low-benefit states. The results of his regression model
(fitted to data for individual establishments) were just the opposite. Injury
62 R. Thaler & S. Rosen, supra note 7.
63 K. Gordon, The Relationship Between Employee Accident Rates and Wages on U.S. Class
I Railroads, 1971 (unpublished paper on file with the author).
64 At the present time, unionized workers and those in the larger firms receive the largest
fringe benefits. The compulsory fringe benefits under Social Security have shown the sharpest
relative increase in the last decade. The magnitude and composition of these fringe benefits
can be found in Oi, supra note 7, at 99-100.
65 Chelius, An Empirical Analysis of Safety Regulations, in 3 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 53 (1973). See also Chelius, The Control of
Industrial Accidents: Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 700
(1974).
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rates were higher in the high-benefit states, and if one were bold (or foolish)
enough to attach causality to this result, it implies that benefit levels should
be reduced to get lower injury rates; Chelius did not draw that inference.
Nevertheless, his findings must, in my opinion, be regarded as highly tenta-
tive for at least two reasons. First, the method of controlling for other con-
tributing factors, such as the age/sex/occupational composition of the
labor force, and labor turnover rates, tacitly assumes that firms of varying
sizes and in different industries confront the same technological trade-offs
between injuries and goods. Second, his measure of injury frequency rates
was based on only a single year's experience. Although Chelius limited his
analysis to establishments with 100 or more employees, the sampling
variability from year to year in injury rates, especially serious injury rates,
is large for firms with 100 to 500 employees.
Further, the NCSWCL proposals that would raise benefit levels can only be
justified on equity grounds."S The Commission failed to provide any empirical ev-
idence that its proposal would operate to reduce the frequency and severity of
industrial accidents. I suspect that the NCSWCL recommendations to expand the
scope of covered employment and injuries67 will also prove not to be consistent
with the goal of minimizing the sum of accident and accident prevention
costs, when the administrative costs of implementing these programs are
taken into account.
B. Statistics, Standards, and Surveillance Under OSHA
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which has been in oper-
ation for three years, has attempted to design and implement federal policies
to lower the industrial accident toll. Its three principal activities have been:
(1) implementing a mandatory system for reporting work injuries and dis-
66 The NCSWCL argued that the scheduled maximum weekly benefits in many states were
well below 66% per cent of average weekly wages and that benefit levels had failed to keep up
with the secular increases in wages. If benefits are defined to include all payments to injured
workers (that is, wage losses and medical bills), they will be equal to premium costs to employers
less the costs and profits of insurers which are a fairly constant proportion of premiums over time.
According to data in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, COM-
PENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 279, Table 17.1 (1973), premium costs for workmen's
compensation as a percentage of wages were as follows:
1940 1.19%
1950 0.89%
1960 0.93%
1970 1.13%
Over the period, 1948-70, this percentage exhibits a significant positive trend; the correlation
for a linear trend line was +.7065. Although benefit levels may lag behind wage changes in a
particular state, the aggregate data do not support the latter contention; premium costs have
increased taster than payrolls of covered workers.
67 In reading the NCSWCL Report, I get the impression that the Commission wanted all
workers to be covered, and the scope of compensable work injuries and diseases greatly enlarged.
In summarizing their recommendations on extending workmen's compensation to self-employed
persons, proprietors, and partners, the Commission recommends "that the term 'employee'
be defined as broadly as possible." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS, THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAws 48 (1972).
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eases, (2) promulgating existing and new federal safety and health standards,
and (3) enforcing compliance through a program of OSHA inspections.68
1. Statistics
The lack of reliable and relevant injury statistics that would enable us to
describe and analyze the industrial safety problem was one of the major con-
cerns in the hearings preceding the establishment of OSHA. Under the 1970
Act, firms are legally compelled to maintain and report work injury statis-
tics according to definitions and procedures set forth by OSHA. From a
purely descriptive viewpoint, the new OSHA injury statistics are likely to be
more reliable, as judged by conventional sampling theory criteria. However,
the switch from ANSI to OSHA definitions makes it difficult to compare in-
jury statistics to earlier data prior to 1971.69 Further, the requirement that each
establishment must post the annual summary of its injury experience for the
preceding year may or may not make it easier for workers to get better infor-
mation about the injury risks for a particular firm.70
From an analytic viewpoint, the comprehensive reporting requirements for
OSHA are unlikely to assist the accident researcher who is attempting to
determine the causal factors that generate industrial accidents. As I argued in
Part III, fragmentary evidence suggests that work injury frequency rates are
higher for younger male workers, are probably higher for production and
newly hired workers, lower for females (although perhaps not if one controls
for occupation), and higher in particular occupations. Although the char-
acteristics of seriously injured workers may be recorded in the logs, these
data are of little value in the absence of additional data on exposure times for
all workers in each category. It is regrettable that the design of the manda-
tory OSHA reporting requirements will result in injury statistics that will
only aid in describing the magnitudes of the frequency and severity of in-
dustrial injuries and diseases in various industries. Thus, the OSHA data will
make no significant contribution to our understanding of how to reduce the
industrial accident toll.
2. Standards
No one, to the best of my knowledge, has studied the economics, politics,
and psychology behind the conception and enactment of federal and state
6 8 The full range of activities is described in EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (1973). OSHA is also involved in
training more industrial safety specialists who can staff positions either as regulators (employees
of OSHA) or as employees of the regulated. Funds are being allocated to the National Institute
on Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to study mainly health hazards.
61 The Z16.1 standard mentioned in note 1 supra was a development of the forerunners of
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). In 1971 it was superseded by the OSHA
definitions outlined in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1904.1-.22 (1973). For a treatment of this subject, see
Schauer & Ryder, supra note 1.
70 A worker could, conceivably, go from plant to plant and examine the posted annual sum-
maries to see which plant had the best industrial safety record last year. He would have to know
the difference between permanent partial versus temporary total disabilities. Since truly serious
work injuries are rare events, the injury record for any one year is not a terribly accurate estimate
of the firm's long-run injury risks.
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health and safety standards.7 1 Hazards that are easily identified, and that
appear to be easily correctable, seem to be the ones for which standards are
set irrespective of the true economic costs and benefits. We thus have stan-
dards for elevators, machine guards, catwalk railings, shatter-proof glass,
the chemical composition of various industrial compounds, and so on, but
no standards for the speed of assembly lines or the characteristics that
workers must possess to hold certain jobs. Asbestosis may be far more
likely to cause disease in workers who smoke, but federal standards do not
prevent smokers from working in asbestos factories.
Many existing safety standards are either ineffective or obsolete, but
little effort is made to appraise their efficacy. The larger issue of whether
mandated safety standards can reduce the frequency and severity of in-
dustrial accidents has been questioned in a study which found that the injury
rates for 25 construction companies in Michigan were approximately the same
as injury rates for a sample of 25 Ohio construction firms even though Ohio
had far stricter safety standards and a larger bureaucracy to oversee its safety
and workmen's compensation program.72 In a review of some unpublished
studies evaluating the benefits of proposed safety standards, I was struck by
the failure to distinguish between marginal and average savings. This short-
coming derives, I suspect, from the absence of a model of accident causation.
A hypothetical example serves to illustrate this point. The absence of a rail-
ing on a particular type of landing was found to be responsible for 50 acci-
dents during a year. If railings are installed, the presumed savings are the
costs of 50 disabling accidents. If the landing is part of a stairway system,
the landing could easily have constituted the "bottleneck" or point of highest
accident risk. The risks of falling on the stairs below the landing were below
what they otherwise would have been because the less agile workers were
caught at the landing. By installing the railing, the frequency of accidents
due to falling down steps will surely increase. The correct benefit that
should be attributed to the railings is the marginal (or incremental) reduction
in all accidents.
Finally, OSHA seems to have a tendency to embrace the most stringent
existing or proposed standards without even attempting to measure the costs
and benefits of the more stringent standards. The lavatory standard promul-
gated by OSHA in 1973 illustrates this point:7 3
The standard.... requires industrial establishments with one to 100 employees
to provide one lavatory for every 10 employees. Firms with more than 100 em-
ployees must provide one fixture for each additional 15 employees.
When the standard was proposed, the association objected pointing out that
New York State required only half as many lavatories for industrial employ-
ment and there was no evidence of "adverse physiological effects or employee
complaints."
... Spencer Foods, Inc., attacked the numbers scheme as being far the
strictest standard in existence, unsupported by health needs, economically
71 Morey, Mandatory Occupational Safety and Health Standards--Some Legal Problems, 38 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 584 (1974).
712 Sands, How Effective Is Safety Legislation?, 11 J. LAw & EcoN. 165 (1968).
73 29 C.F.R. § 1910.141(d)(2) (1973).
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onerous, and insufficiently discriminating in types of employment. Several
companies suggested some kind of grandfather clause covering existing fa-
cilities.7 4
In Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. United States Department of
Labor, 7 5 the Second Circuit, after examining the basis for the lavatory
standard,7 6 vacated the pertinent portion of the OSHA standard and remanded
the case to the Department of Labor "for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion."7 The number of federal safety and health standards is already
astronomically large and continues to grow; it would seem prudent to insist
that henceforth OSHA prove the efficacy and economic desirability of any
new standards.
3. Surveillance
The largest part of the OSHA budget is devoted to its inspection program.
As of December, 1973, OSHA employed 556 field officers to enforce com-
pliance with OSHA safety and health standards. Some 36,100 inspections
were made in 1972, and penalties of over $3 million were levied against
firms that violated the OSHA standards.78 Given budget constraints and a
population of roughly 5 million establishments, OSHA must establish a
priority system for determining which establishments are to be inspected.
External factors, such as work fatalities or catastrophes and employee com-
plaints, determine the first priorities. Establishments that fall under the
Target Industry Program and the Target Health Hazards Program are then
singled out for more frequent inspections. Finally, a random sampling
scheme of the remaining establishments is used to assign inspectors to
plants.
If, for the moment, we assume that OSHA safety inspections are
indeed effective in reducing injury rates F, does the present priority system
lead to the largest reduction in the incidence of industrial accidents? Two
features of the OSHA assignment scheme lead me to suspect that it does not.
First, emphasis is placed on the injury frequency rate and not on the total
number of injuries per year. Second, the chances that an establishment will
be inspected are not appreciably different for small and large establishments
in a given industry. A numerical example illustrates the first point. Suppose
that there are 100 firms in both industries A and B. The injury rate in industry
A is twice as high as that in industry B, say FA = 40 per million man-
hours and FB = 20. The OSHA scheme would assign more inspectors to
7' The Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. filed suit to rescind this standard. See
Daily Labor Report, Oct. 15, 1973, § A, at 11.
75 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973).
76 "The only legitimate reliance [for the lavatory standard] is on (1) the codes of five states. :.
of which the Depaittment could take official notice but to which petitioner opposes twelve."
Id. at 352.
7 Id. at 354.
78 More detailed data were available for the last half of 1972 in which 16,756 inspections
identified 57,527 violations. Roughly 58 per cent of the inspections resulted in the issuance
of citations. However, only 0.73 per cent of all violations were classified as serious. Additional
data can be found in EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT's REPORT ON OCCU-
PATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 33-42 (1973).
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industry A. But this fails to account for possible differences in the exposure
to risks. If industry A employs 10,000 workers (20 million man-hours) and
industry B hired 30,000 (60 million man-hours), then the annual number of
disabling work injuries would be 800 in industry A and 1,200 in industry B.
If a safety inspection could lower the injury rate by 20 per cent, (and the
budget only allowed us to conduct 100 inspections), we could save more
disabling work injuries by assigning inspectors to industry B which ex-
periences a lower injury rate but also has larger numbers of workers exposed
to risks. A similar exercise can be carried out to demonstrate the principle
that larger establishments should be inspected more frequently.7 9
The more important question is whether safety inspections are effective
and desirable at all. What are the costs and benefits of OSHA inspections?
We can get a rough idea of the social costs of inspections from some back
of the envelope calculations, which suggest a lower bound guesstimate of
around $500 per inspection. 80 The benefits are harder to gauge because we
lack the data to estimate the net savings in accident and accident prevention
costs resulting from OSHA inspections. The published data in The President's
Report on Occupational Safety and Health allows us to determine the nature
of the violations and the industry and size of inspected establishments.
However, we cannot, for example, compare the previous work injury ex-
periences of establishments cited for violations with those not cited. Further-
more, it seems that OSHA follow-ups are mainly concerned with determining
whether the cited violations have been corrected rather than with the larger
and more pertinent issue of measuring the post-inspection safety record
against the firm's previous work injury experience. The benefits of the
OSHA inspection program might well exceed the costs, but we simply do
not have the requisite data to make this empirical determination.8 1 Pub-
lished accounts of the activities of OSHA, including its outside contracts,
reveal no attempts by the agency either to evaluate the efficacy of its in-
spection program or to estimate its costs and benefits. I find this rather
distressing.
79 I have carried out these illustrative calculations using the 1968-70 size profiles of injury
frequency rates for three two-digit manufacturing industries. Although establishments with
50 to 99 employees typically reported the highest injury rates, it turns out that the productivity
of an inspection is larger when establishments with say 250 to 499 employees are inspected first.
See Oi, supra note 26, at pt. V.
80 1 assume that the annual cost of each inspector (his wages and fringe benefits and the costs
of supporting personnel and equipment) is around $25,000. Each inspector probably makes around
100 inspections a year implying a cost to OSHA of $250 per inspection. Travel may add another
$50. To this, we must add the costs to the inspected establishment that must assign supervisory
and clerical staff to accompany the inspector (and typically either a union representative or con-
versations with workers), as well as the value of any lost output due to disruptions in the normal
productive process. I assume that these costs to the firm are at least $200. I believe that these
guesses are on the low side, and I would not be surprised to learn that the social cost per inspection
(including costs to both the inspecting and inspected) could go as high as $1,500.
81 At a minimum, we would have to have data on (1) the reduction in the number and kinds
of disabling work injuries due to inspections, (2) the costs to workers and firms of the various
kinds of industrial accidents, and (3) the prevention costs of eliminating the hazards. It will be
remembered that, according to the Wisconsin Report, at most 25 per cent of all industrial accidents
were caused by physical hazards that could be identified by inspections. WIscoNsIN STATE
DEP'T OF LABOR, INDUSTRY, AND HUMAN RELATIONS, supra note 22.
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CONCLUSION
The public concern about industrial safety is understandable. Industrial
accidents-or for that matter, any accidents-are tragic events. We do not
like to attach monetary values to the outcomes of truly serious accidents;
what is the proper monetary sum to compensate a man for the loss of his
sight? As a result, many rally to the slogan of "safety at any cost" when they
are told about the plight of seriously disabled workers. However, "safety at
any cost" carried to its logical conclusion has socially unacceptable economic
implications. The production of goods, such as meat, coal, oil, lumber, and
garbage collection, which involves high work injury risks would be outlawed
in order to reduce the frequency of severe industrial accidents. But this is an
extreme position, and moderates should contend that more industrial safety
is all that is needed. Yet, in the light of the available empirical evidence, I
am unable to conclude whether the current equilibrium work injury rates
are above or below the socially optimal injury risks. What I have tried to
emphasize in this paper is that the socially optimal injury risks are those which
minimize the sum of accident costs and accident prevention costs. Only
if the current levels of industrial injury risks exceed (or fall below) these
optimal levels is there a basis for public intervention.
